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Abstract:
This paper can be seen as a contribution to the debate on political populism. More specifically, 
we focus on the relation between populist strategies and the perception of corruption. The 
issue of corruption and the fight against it is a part of various political strategies, programs, 
and rhetoric. In some cases, however, it lingers only on a rhetorical level, and the issue of 
corruption is used by politicians merely as a tool for gaining political points or to harm 
political opponents, whom they label “corruptionists”. The goal of this paper is to provide 
an interpretation of the ways in which Czech President Miloš Zeman constructs the issues 
that are related to the topic of corruption and to interpret how such content figures into the 
theoretical framework of populism. Methodologically speaking, the text is established as a 
CAQDAS dataset created by all of Zeman’s speeches, interviews, statements, etc., which were 
processed using MAXQDA11+ software. This paper shows that the dominant treatment of the 
topic of corruption by the president is primarily linked to the creation and assignment of 
delegitimising labels (“corruptionist”) to his opponents or the legitimisation of his allies and 
himself (as “corruption fighter”), which is the quintessence of populist strategies.
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Introduction
“I am a supporter of direct democracy and I support the opinion that citizens – because they do not have 
various clientelist connections as some politicians do – can make less biased decisions in referendums 
than these politicians.”1
This paper is a contribution to the debate on political populism or populism in the sense of a 
political strategy (cf. Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). One of the basic elements of a populist strategy 
is the creation of homogeneous and mutually antagonistic groups – the “corrupt elite” and the 
“pure people” (Mudde, 2004). At the same time, a populist assumes the role of a representative 
of the people and legitimises his/her political requirements by stating that he/she is fulfilling 
the will of the people (Antal, 2017). A political populist uses stances against the political elite as 
corrupted actors as a basic strategy to achieve goals. Certain anti-establishment appeals are a 
part of populism (Barr, 2009). Research on the relationship between populism and the labelling 
of political opponents (and others) as corrupt actors is presently perceived in academic debate as 
a relevant research problem. We contribute to this debate and existing research (cf. Jansen, 2011)
*       E-mail address of the corresponding author: vnaxera@kap.zcu.cz
1      From speech of Miloš Zeman (2017).
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with an analysis of the issue based on the example of Czech President Miloš Zeman.2 The goal 
of this paper is to provide an interpretation of the ways in which Czech President Miloš Zeman 
constructs the issues that are related to the topic of corruption and to interpret how such content 
figures into the theoretical framework of populism.3
All of Miloš Zeman’s speeches, interviews, and articles in his first election period make up the 
resource base (see below). From these speeches, we can deduce three “islands of deviation” – a 
term he coined himself – that (according to Zeman) present a problem for Czech society. The first 
island is made up of “neo-Nazi guerrillas, who occasionally raise havoc in the streets of our cities”, 
and the second island of deviation is “a significant portion of the Czech media”.4 For our paper, 
however, the third island of deviation is the most important one:
Some of the most dangerous islands are the godfather-like mafias that are a parasite on the 
body of Czech society, sucking the blood from it and not giving any added value back to this 
society in return, whether in the form of new investments or properly paid taxes. From a 
long-term perspective, I am deeply convinced that the most efficient tool for fighting against 
2      For more than twenty years, Miloš Zeman has without a doubt been one of the most prominent figures in Czech 
politics. In the first half of the 1990s, he became chairman of the Social Democratic Party, which he built up from a party 
with minimal supporters to one of the strongest political actors in the country and a party that repeatedly won elections 
at end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. Thanks to these successes, Miloš Zeman also became the head of the Czech 
Government from 1998 to 2002. Due to Zeman’s political style and several conflicts within both government and party, he 
was replaced in the positions of chairman of the Social Democrats and Prime Minister by Vladimír Špidla in 2002. Špidla 
slowly profiled himself as a representative of the “other stream” within the Social Democratic Party. After Zeman’s failed 
candidacy for the presidential seat in 2003, when even members of his own party voted against him in an indirect election, 
a schism took place within the social democrats and marked Zeman’s departure to his position as “the Pensioner from 
the Highlands”. From that position, he continued to comment on political events, reiterating the clashes within social 
democracy and supporting the newly established, obscure, and marginal Party of Civic Rights, which in the first years of its 
existence bore the nickname “Zemanites” (Zemanovci). After direct presidential elections were instated, Zeman began to 
profile himself as a non-partisan candidate advocating the interests of the people. After a very negatively-toned campaign, 
which managed to polarise the Czech public (cf. Červinková & Kulhavá, 2013), he became the third president of the inde-
pendent Czech Republic in the second round of the historically first direct election in 2013. Equipped with strong legitimacy 
stemming from the nationwide popular vote, Zeman began to serve his function in office in a way that further polarised 
Czech society. He actively intervened in political processes in a manner that did not correspond with a parliamentary regime 
or constitutionally determined powers, thus destabilising the Czech political scene. An example of the polarisation of society 
can be found in Zeman’s rhetorical strategies – he often labels his supporters “normal people”. According to Zeman, this part 
of society stands in opposition to the “Prague café”. This term is often used as a label to stigmatise and delegitimise Zeman’s 
opponents as people who do not work and are not in touch with the “real world of normal workers”. This can be seen as a 
typical populist strategy (cf. Mudde, 2004). An example of the performance of Zeman’s office in a way that goes against the 
assumption of a parliamentary regime (not necessary of the constitution) is the inauguration of the government of Jiří Rus-
nok (see below in the text). Also, immediately after his election, he became highly active in the media, granting interviews 
to daily tabloid newspapers, disinformation websites, and on his own television show. This show is broadcast by a marginal 
and private television station. Broadcasting began roughly around the time when Zeman was expected to announce his sec-
ond candidacy for the second presidential term of office. Initially, the program was moderated by the wife of the Chancellor 
of the President’s Office, which we consider to be an unprecedented conflict of interests. The wife of Zeman’s subordinate 
provides unlimited space for the president to express his opinions, which are not confronted in the form of a debate that 
various ideological opponents could join in on. Thanks to this program, Miloš Zeman was able to announce that he would 
not be taking part in any broadcasted debates with other candidates before the second election took place. Throughout the 
course of his whole political career, Miloš Zeman has been known for generating strong statements often made on a person-
al level. He has handed out various labels to his political opponents, which have often been borderline or blatantly vulgar. 
This is also typical for political populism (cf. Tarchi, 2016). This has led a large portion of the Czech public to accept Zeman 
and left the remainder to spurn him. After his election to the post of president, Zeman gained additional opportunities to 
use these strategies to a wholly new extent.
3      In regard to the fact that the president can be considered without a doubt to be a moral authority or a “moral entrepre-
neur” (cf. Cohen, 2011), the labels that he creates and introduces into dominant political and social discourse (in the sense of 
the notion of how things should be – Chiapello & Fairclough, 2002, p. 195) are a highly relevant topic of research. The Czech 
President (as an institution and a specific individual) has long held a high position in terms of public approval ratings carried 
out by the Public Opinion Research Centre under the Czech Academy of Sciences. For this reason, it can be assumed that the 
messages of the president are seen by a large portion of Czech society as “the truth” or “objective reality”, which is further 
mediated and amplified by the media (cf. Altheide, 2002; Žúborová & Borárosová, 2016). Analysis of presidential speeches 
and strategies via the framework of populism also exists (cf. Hawkins 2009). The analysis of presidential speeches has a 
strong tradition in political science (see Meernik & Ault, 2013; Gregor & Macková, 2015; Cheng, 2006), which stems from the 
symbolic importance of the function on which certain expectations are based (cf. Scacco & Coe, 2017). Through his speeches, 
the president creates certain narratives – in this sense, presidential speeches are understood as an integral part of the public 
sphere, which is also linked to the construction of the shape of democracy in a given country (Reisigl, 2008).
4      Since his times in the function of Prime Minister, Zeman has been well known for his negative attitudes towards the 
media. This attitude stands unchanged and Zeman often labels some journalists or media as “idiots”, “boneheads”, etc.
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these economic mafias is a law on declaring the origin of income and property, including the 
possibility to confiscate illegally acquired – that is, stolen – property. Although the president 
does not have legislative initiative, I will patiently attempt to convince deputies and senators 
to propose such a law and for such a law to be passed.5 
It is clear that this island of deviation is directly linked to behaviour of a corrupt nature. Although 
President Zeman named three problems in the introductory quote above that were different to 
those he listed off in his inauguration speech containing references to islands of deviation, he put 
an emphasis on corruption in both cases. 
Corruption is without a doubt a phenomenon that is understood in dominant discourses as a 
negative one (cf. Naxera, 2015b), as it tends to carry with it a whole score of long and short-term 
consequences generally considered to be problematic (Johnston, 1989) – it harms public finances, 
citizens’ equal access to the state, and democracy as such (cf. Ceva & Ferretti, 2018). When citizens 
are convinced of the corruption of public space and the inability or unwillingness of political 
representatives and institutions to deal with corruption, the situation may be reflected in the ways 
in which these citizens periodically evaluate political representatives, institutions, or regimes as 
such and what measure of trust they put into them. In extreme cases, a deviation may occur away 
from democracy or away from support for the existing political representation, leading to a change 
in voting behaviour (Linek, 2010; Naxera, 2015a; cf. Hacek, Kukovic & Brezovsek, 2013; Slomczynski 
& Shabad, 2011; Naxera, 2018). The topic of corruption may thus become a significant part of the 
political battle, where labelling oneself a corruption fighter and all others “corruptionists” may 
serve as an effective populist strategy (cf. Moffitt & Tormey, 2014) for winning elections. This 
mainly functions in cases where the public is generally convinced of the corruptness of political 
parties (or, according to theory of populism, “corrupt elites”; cf. Mudde, 2004) – according to polls, 
such a situation has existed in the Czech Republic for a long period of time (CVVM, 2014). These 
environments and situations are suitable for the success and emergence of new populist political 
actors, who take a stance and mobilise against the existing party establishment (cf. Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2017).
The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of the ways in which Czech President Miloš 
Zeman constructs the issues that are related to the topic of corruption and to interpret how such 
content figures into the theoretical framework of populist political strategies. We will focus on 
various mutually intertwined issues – primarily on how Miloš Zeman defines corruption, what in 
his opinion are its causes and effects, how corruption may be fought, and what purposes Miloš 
Zeman’s references to corruption and anti-corruption serve. This last point is the core of our 
analysis. Our argumentation stems from Steven Sampson’s (2011) assumption that “anti-corruption 
is not innocent.” He claims that anti-corruption can be perceived as a tool of power, which makes 
it possible to control resources and other political actors. Although our effort is to analyse all 
aspects of Zeman’s perception of corruption, the core of our analysis is based on the following 
question: “How does Miloš Zeman instrumentally use the topic of corruption as a tool within his 
populist political strategy?”
Stances against corruption as a populist strategy
The debate on populism is extensive and the concept takes on a number of forms in this debate. 
The currently dominant views of populism deal with the term as an ideology (Mudde, 2004; 
Aslanidis, 2016), as discourse (Laclau, 2005), or as a specific style of policy or strategy (Moffitt 
and Tormey 2014). This is the interpretation that we lean toward in this study. All fundamental 
texts dealing with populism agree that one of the key categories that populism works with is the 
“us” vs. “them” dichotomisation (Barr, 2009, p. 31; Sanders, Hurtado & Zoragastua, 2017). In all 
forms of populism, the concept of “our” endangerment, i.e. of “the people”, plays a significant role. 
This danger stems from variously defined enemies, which can include, among others, corrupt elites 
5      All verbatim quotations listed in the text come from the data corpus that we created and processed. Therefore, we do not 
consider it purposeful to provide specific links that would otherwise disturb the flow of the text.
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(Wolkenstein, 2016). In its emphasis on resistance toward the elites (and primarily political elites), 
populism is a distinctly anti-establishment principle (Barr, 2009). The anti-establishment appeal can 
be seen as a strategy, which is evident in the fact that a similar rhetoric remains present even when 
the populists themselves have for a considerable time been part of the establishment. The one factor 
that changes is the nature of the establishment, which is the goal of the anti-elite rhetoric. 
Points of reference that populists often take a stance against include corruption or corrupt politicians, 
parties, and the existing establishment in general (Barr, 2009; Jansen, 2011). This stance, however, 
does not mean that populist actors that criticise the corruption of others have themselves strictly 
refused corrupt practices. Criticism of the corruption of the existing establishment is thus merely a 
tool that populists use in their search for power. As an example, we can cite the Czech parliamentary 
elections in 2010, when the newly formed Public Affairs (Věci veřejné) movement gained success 
(see Hanley & Sikk, 2016), or in 2013 and 2017, when Czech billionaire Andrej Babiš (cf. Kopeček, 
2016) was highly successful in elections. Babiš presented himself using the motto “everyone steals”. 
Both of these parties entered the political sphere from the business environment with a “mantra of 
anti-corruption” as the main point of their programs. These programs did not have any uniqueness 
compared to the other programs, except for one – both of these parties presented themselves as 
something “new and not corrupt”. As we have already mentioned, ANO used the motto “everyone 
steals”, and Public Affairs introduced themselves with the slogan “out with political dinosaurs” 
(see Hanley & Sikk, 2016). Despite this argumentation, both populist political parties (cf. Kubánek, 
2016) have experiences with corruption among their representatives after their election to political 
functions. In the case of the political party Public Affairs, which was a member of government 
(2010–2013), we can find several corruption charges linked to the main representatives and also to 
members of government (see Hloušek, 2012). The case of ANO is the same and Andrej Babiš and 
other representatives of this movement face criminal prosecution for suspicion of fraud with public 
funding of Babiš’s companies. Actors who actively use the issue of corruption include President 
Zeman, despite the fact that the period of the so-called “Opposition Agreement”, when Zeman was 
head of government, tends to be linked to a rise in the number corrupt transactions in top politics 
(Kopeček, 2013), a fact that was reflected in a score of studies (Corruption Perception Index, Varieties 
of Democracy etc.).6
In this context, a relationship to broader academic debate dealing with corruption and anti-corruption 
strategies (see Schmidt 2007) can be found. As we pointed out above in the case of Czech political 
parties, anti-corruption is often seen as a “rewarding” topic. This is why political actors (not limited 
to those populist) often utilise anti-corruption discourse and the willingness of voters to punish 
corrupt representatives via elections (see Bauhr & Charron, 2018; Slomczynski & Shabad, 2011). 
However, this does not mean that anti-corruption rhetoric has to be linked to real anti-corruption 
practices. It should also be noted that other research studies highlight the fact that “anti-corruption 
warriors” are often corrupt and/or corrupting and the “war against corruption” is only their populist 
political strategy. The debate related to the instrumental (mis)use of anti-corruption is not limited 
to populism and is relevant for both democratic regimes (see Sampson 2011 and his example of the 
Balkans) and authoritarian regimes (see Zhu & Zhang, 2017; Burger & Gitau, 2010; Karklins, 2002, p. 
29; Holmes, 2015, p. 90–91). The subject of our interest is the (mis)use of anti-corruption rhetoric by 
political populists. As we have stated above, it is important in this context to place anti-corruption 
rhetoric into the overall populist strategy of the given actor, which is based primarily on the “people” 
versus “the elite” dichotomisation (Mudde, 2004), anti-establishment appeal (Barr, 2009), and the 
creation of delegitimising labels that are handed out primarily to the existing political elite in order 
to stigmatise them (Tarchi, 2016).
6      The term “opposition agreement” is used for the governmental arrangement in 1998–2002, when a one-coloured minority 
government of social democrats ruled. This minority was supported by agreement and held in power by the Civic Democratic 
Party, which made a commitment not to call for a vote of confidence on the government. Both parties divided up power in 
a number of government institutions, which was one of the reasons for contemplations on the growth of the potential for 
corruption (for more details see Kopeček, 2013). 
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Data and methodology
Methodologically speaking, this paper has been conceived as a CAQDAS7 dataset, which is made 
up of complete interviews, statements, speeches, and other expressions made by Miloš Zeman in 
the first presidential election period (March 2013 – March 2018). All documents were taken from 
the official website of the President of the Republic (http://www.zemanmilos.cz/cz/).8 The total 
extent of the dataset is 730,192 words. The dataset was processed using MAXQDA11+ software,9 
while using the extended lexical search method. The search subject included words that are linked 
to the topic of corruption, specifically:10 corruption/to corrupt/corrupted, godfather11, clientelism, 
bribe, criminal, theft, to tunnel/tunneller/tunnel12, mafia/mobster. In all, after manually cleaning13 
the results, we identified 221 codes, i.e. results of key word searches. This means that we found 
221 of Zeman’s statements related to issues of corruption. After the first reading of these codes, 
we realised that Zeman used some of these statements in similar ways. We detected six different 
methods of the use of corruption-related issues in Zeman’s speeches. We used the standard 
procedure of inductive coding carried out using specialised software (see Saldana, 2009). On the 
basis of inductive coding, we then divided the codes that were found into several subcategories. 
This is linked to the fact that the size of the data corpus allows us to follow the contexts in 
which the actor operationalises the term corruption, what purposes they have for speaking about 
corruption, what reasons they have for using this topic, and how they use the phenomenon of 
corruption (and anti-corruption) in agreement with the assumptions of populism as a strategy 
(Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Based on this idea, we are able to interpret several varying methods for 
dealing with the topic of corruption (although codes may overlap in many cases). Thus, we could 
claim that our approach was hermeneutic (see Ricoeur, 1981).
First, we must determine the attributes of corruption. In other words, we must state the way in 
which Miloš Zeman defines corrupt behaviour (26 codes in total). This definition is followed by 
taking a stance, and corruption is thus perceived as a reference point of desired behaviour (15 
codes in total). The next category relates to the causes of corrupt behaviour – in such codes, Zeman 
presents his perspective on what allows corrupt opportunities to arise and what leads to the actual 
use of these opportunities (24 codes in total). Naturally, corruption also has various consequences 
(on politics, the economy, society), which are linked to another concept of the phenomenon (14 
codes in total). A part of Zeman’s projection of himself as a corruption fighter includes suggestions 
for certain solutions in suppressing corruption (50 codes in total). The final and perhaps most 
interesting point – and clearly the most frequent (92 codes in total) – is the use of the topic of 
corruption as a label via which the president delegitimises his opponents or legitimises his own 
behaviour and his supporters. As is evident from the high number of occurrences of the final 
category, Zeman uses corruption to stigmatise his opponents, which is an assumption stemming 
from the theory of populism (Tarchi, 2016).
We have already mentioned a number of these uses of the topic of corruption in the president’s 
inauguration quote above on islands of deviation – in it, we find mention of corruption in the 
sense of attributes (“mafias that are a parasite on Czech society”), reference points (“mafias are 
dangerous”), consequences (“mafias suck the blood from the body of society”), and solutions (“a 
solution is a law on declaring the origin of income and property”). Methodologically speaking, 
7     CAQDAS is an acronym for Computer Assisted Qualitative Data AnalysiS.
8     This website is in Czech. All verbatim quotations taken from the webpage were translated by the authors of this article 
and proofread by a native English speaker.
9     MAXQDA is software for CAQDAS that enables the processing of a vast amount of qualitative text data (see Oswald, 2019).
10    Roots of the Czech equivalents of these words were used for the analysis.
11     In the Czech context, the term “godfather” came into use to label regional patrons involved in corrupt and clientelist 
structures between the political sphere and private business (e.g. Müller, 2012).
12     The term “to tunnel” originally referred to the construction or path clearing of transport or other tunnels, but the 
words “to tunnel” or “to tunnel out” began to be used in the Czech language in connection with the theft of investment and 
privatisation funds during post-communist transformation as a term for the theft of such funds internally by insiders. Today 
the term is used as a metaphor in a global context.
13     During this cleaning process, occurrences of terms that were not linked to the topic of corruption (e.g. “tunnel” in the 
meaning of traffic infrastructure or “criminal behavior” nonrelated to corruption activities) were deleted.
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these code categories allowed us to structure our analysis into a logical frame. Our analysis had 
the following structure:
Attributes of corruption → Corruption as a reference point → Reasons for corruption → Consequences 
of corruption → Solutions of this problem → Using issues of corruption as a (de)legitimisation label
From the perspective of political populism, the last category is most important to us, therefore, 
it will be given the most attention (as was mentioned above, it is the most strongly represented 
category in the corpus). All of these categories have a certain inner logic – our effort was to find 
and interpret this logic and illustrate it by using direct quotes from Zeman’s statements. This 
means that the statements and direct quotes that we have listed in the text do not capture the 
uniqueness of their occurrence, but represent the overall logic of portraying corruption and its 
(mis)use in a populist manner (cf. Jansen, 2011) in the discourse created by the president.
The design of our analysis stems from the tradition of interpretative political science (see Bevir & 
Rhodes, 2016), and thus our effort did not aim to find causality or provide an explanation of the 
analysed phenomenon. We attempted to put forward an interpretation based on the transparency 
of our procedures and arguments. We perceive methodology as a “map and key to the chest full 
of qualitative data”. 
Interpretation
In this paper, we focus on interpreting the ways in which President Zeman deals with the topic of 
corruption and in what specific populist ways he makes use of this phenomenon. Before moving 
to the interpretation of individual categories of codes and their link to political populism, we find 
it suitable to mention the connection with the mutual occurrence of variedly conceived references 
to the topic of corruption. The largest overlap can be found in the categories of (de)legitimisation 
labels and solutions. In other words, if President Zeman labels various actors (either abstract or 
more concrete) as corruptionists (and therefore delegitimises them), he very often also offers a 
solution for how to combat this issue.
The total overlap of codes shows that when Zeman speaks about corruption in any sense, he also 
very often frames this reference into the form of a delegitimising label. A typical example can be 
seen in the following statement:
You know, as I’ve been saying for 20 years now, that I differentiate entrepreneurs into two 
types. The “Baťa“ type and the “Kožený” type.[ 14] The “Kožený” type today are called godfathers, 
but what we call them is not important. What is important are the resources that their assets 
stem from. Therefore, incessantly, like a broken record, I repeat that the only thing that will 
help clear up who is who is a law on property declaration, including the declaration of the 
origin of property.
As we mentioned, the main parts of this chapter will be structured according to the framework 
characterised above. Let us now move on to the individual categories, starting with the attributes 
of corruption, i.e. how Miloš Zeman defines corruption. Zeman perceives corruption as criminal 
behaviour: “[…] what else would corruption be but economic crime […]”; the principle of corruption 
is “theft of both private and state property”. We can find corruption on various levels of the political 
system: “[corruption is a problem that we find] not only on a central level; on a regional and 
communal level there are also many corruption scandals.” In many regards, the term corruption 
is linked to the principles of clientelism, which Zeman speaks about very often as an issue for the 
proper functioning of Czech politics and society. In terms of the way in which Miloš Zeman defines 
the attributes of corruption, we find examples of typically populist statements: 
14      These terms refer to the industrialist Tomáš Baťa from the Czechoslovak interwar period and Viktor Kožený, infamous for 
tunneling out funds over the course of post-Communist transformation.
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[a presidential candidate in indirect elections formerly used in the Czech Republic] does not 
have to go into a true election battle, because the 281 other people [this is the number of 
members of both chambers of the Czech Parliament] can make a deal with each other based 
on partisan schemes and some of them may be corrupt. But you can’t corrupt eight million 
registered voters.
The attribute present here is the link between corruption, partisan politics, and relationships 
between political parties, which fully convenes with public opinion in the Czech Republic (e.g. CVVM 
2014; for a broader context see Slomczynski & Shabad, 2011). Zeman’s statement also legitimises 
his position, as he reached it via a direct vote by the citizenry. Comments that political parties are 
corrupt actors can be found in other statements as well. In this case, we find the dichotomisation 
that Cas Mudde (2004) speaks of in his work – pure people that cannot be corrupted stand against 
the political elite. Elements of political populism are even contained in the very way that Zeman 
defines corruption. We will return to the labelling of politicians and political parties as corrupt 
actors in the following code categories.
 
The second code category is linked to corruption as the reference point of desired political 
behaviour. Zeman relates the topic of corruption to how things should or should not be. As we 
will see, even in this category we find a strong link to elements of (de)legitimisation (cf. Marion & 
Oliver, 2012). This also takes place in a populist spirit (cf. Tarchi, 2016). We have mentioned above 
that, according to Zeman, corruption is wrong and should be combatted. In the president’s view, 
however, present political actors are not doing so: “Corruption, which we fight so beautifully with 
words while doing practically nothing against it.” Political parties are primarily to blame: “These 
parties have become lazy, these parties have godfathered, and these parties have often been 
incapable of finding and offering prominent individuals or an attractive and viable plan.” Zeman, 
however, presents himself as an exception to this rule, as he talks about never “having become 
involved with any so-called political entrepreneurs, nor has my largest opponent every labelled 
me a corruptionist.” He thus links corruption to political parties, and the principle of parties is 
conceived as political businesses (see Krouwel 2012), several of which have appeared in the Czech 
party system in previous years. It is, however, somewhat paradoxical that Andrej Babiš, who is 
an extreme case of a political entrepreneur and also linked to a number of corruption scandals 
(Kopeček, 2016, p. 742), is at present (June 2018) a key political ally to the president. This is linked 
to the fact that Andrej Babiš continually aims his rhetoric against political parties as poorly-built 
structures and claims that he himself is not a politician (Kopeček, 2016, p. 742; Cirhan & Kopecký, 
2017; Naxera, 2015a). Similarly, to the example of Miloš Zeman, Andrej Babiš’s strategy has been 
purely populist since the very existence of his political engagement (Kubánek, 2016; cf. Moffitt & 
Tormey, 2016). Zeman has used this line of resistance against parties as corrupt actors in other 
cases (cf. Mudde, 2004), when he spoke of the so-called “bureaucrat/caretaker government”15, 
which he nominated himself, in the following sense:
This is the first government in the Czech Republic that has the support of both employer 
associations and labour unions [but not the parliament – see footnote above], which are two 
mutually opposed groups that strongly differ in their interests. It is a government that is a tool 
in the fight against corruption, as their program declaration contains the commitment not 
to interfere in the ongoing investigation or disturb this investigation via political pressure.16 
The reference point is thus linked to the legitimising label, which is also related to the fact that the 
government in reality was a government of “Zeman’s friends”. The politicians who did not belong 
in the circle of Zeman’s followers are labelled “populists, who would create nothing, populists, 
15      Zeman nominated this government in 2013 after the previous right-wing government resigned due to a wave of corruption 
scandals (Kupka & Mochťak, 2014; compare Naxera, 2015a). Zeman labeled the government “bureaucratic” and “professional”, 
but in reality it was dominantly comprised of politicians of various parties that could be seen as Zeman’s personal followers – this 
was visible in the fact that, in the elections that followed, several members of this government ran for the party mentioned above 
in which Zeman served as honorable chairman. Also, the head of this government Jiří Rusnok had previously been the minister 
of finance in the Zeman-led government. He left the government in power for several months despite the fact that the party did 
not gain a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies.
16      This investigation dealt with scandals involving the previous right-wing government (see Kupka & Mochťak, 2014).
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who would only give, populists, who have tolerated tunnellers for a long time.” Such politicians 
are thus outside the circle of Zeman’s followers, a circle that includes Jiří Rusnok or Andrej Babiš. 
Attacks on his political opponents (i.e. de facto all political representatives standing outside 
the circle of his followers) and their delegitimisation and stigmatisation (in this case labelled 
tunnellers, corruptionists, and populists) is a common political strategy (Tarchi, 2016; Antal 2017).
There are certain reasons for the existence of corruption opportunities and the fact that these 
opportunities are taken advantage of. On a general level, the “lazy and corrupt political parties” 
are to blame for these problems, as they provide protection to corrupt and mafia-like structures. 
“Because, without political protection, these godfathers could not exist, and if they did, it would 
only be for a very, very short time.” One of the reasons for the corruption of political parties 
according to Zeman is their small party membership: “This logically points to the fact that there 
isn’t a very large personnel selection for the ballots, and this small amount of members can 
hardly make an impact on the influence of the so-called political entrepreneurs.” In addition to 
political parties, which always play a role in Zeman’s speeches regarding the causes of corruption, 
unsatisfactory laws are to blame for the amount of corruption or, in his words, the “set of rules, 
whether they are laws against corruption, against laundering dirty money, or against tunnelling 
in general.” Insufficient legislative protection stems from the unwillingness of political parties to 
deal with corruption. The fundamental problem is the lack of political will, which is a cause that is 
also dealt with by experts in the field of corruption (see Naxera, 2015b; Holmes, 2003). In addition 
to parties, the media is also to blame, which fully convenes with Zeman’s disgust for journalists. 
He attempts to delegitimise them via corruption as well:
/…/ independence not only from political pressures, but also against pressures of the 
mainstream media, which to the very last moment have claimed that some allegations are 
totally false, they’re completely baseless, until it turned out that the people who weren’t 
elected by the citizenry could make decisions on overpriced public procurements, doling out 
prominent positions in the administration, and this hydra, this clientelist network, was wholly 
neglected by our mainstream media.
 
Attacks on the media as enemies of the people (cf. Antal, 2017) are another typical expression of 
populism. In addition to the media and political parties, courts are also an issue as they allow for 
corrupt transactions. According to Zeman, they are in some cases linked to parties and provide 
protection to corruption. These corruptionists and godfathers “were under the smoke-screen of 
the judiciary’s indifference or the bias of the judiciary in their favour.” “Primarily in questions 
of economic crime, courts rule in a desperately slow manner and there is suspicion that some 
judges are corrupt.” Even after more than twenty years of post-communist privatisation and 
economic transformation (see Myant, 2013), Zeman continues to return to these trials (he often 
speaks of Viktor Kožený) and calls privatisation one of the sources of corruption (cf. Arikan, 2008; 
Holmes, 2003; Grzymala-Busse, 2007). In this respect, Zeman has been consistent in his critique of 
privatisation for over twenty years. If we shift our focus from the initial post-communist period, 
however, the main causes of corruption in contemporary Czech politics in Zeman’s eyes include 
the insufficient political will of parties, the representatives of which are involved in corruption 
themselves while they are protected by the courts and media. Zeman’s arguments are distinctly 
anti-establishment (cf. Barr, 2009) and populistically create the image of a conspiratorial network 
of courts, journalists, and politicians acting against the interest of the president and the “ordinary 
people”. At the same time, Zeman stylises himself into the role of the representative of this group 
(cf. Wolkenstein, 2016).
Corruption has a whole score of consequences – in addition to consequences concerning both 
sides of the corrupt transaction, there are consequences that impact the whole of society and the 
system (Bayley, 1966; Ceva & Ferretti 2018). The indirect consequences are many – both short-term 
and long-term (Johnston, 1989). This involves economic consequences (e.g. Mauro, 2004; Choi & 
Woo 2011; Drury, Krieckhaus & Lusztig, 2006), as the finances spent on corrupt activities limit the 
amount of public finances. Typical short-term consequences are rises in costs, slow-downs, and 
the unpredictability of bureaucratic procedures (Naxera, 2015b). In a more general and long-term 
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sense, we should mention the disruption of citizens’ equal access to the state, which should lie at 
the core of the liberal democratic system (cf. Rawls, 1971). This is something that may be linked 
to citizens’ distrust of their representatives, the system’s institutions, and the system itself (Linek, 
2010; Hacek, Kukovic & Brezovsek, 2013; Kovalčíková & Lačný, 2016).
Zeman also speaks about the decrease in trust in political parties: “Not only on a central level, 
but on a regional and communal level, there are too many corruption scandals that discredit 
the representatives of these parties” (see also Linek, 2010; Naxera, 2015b). Zeman’s following 
statement can also be interpreted in the spirit of the concept of populism (cf. Tarchi, 2016): “People 
are disgusted by the commonness, the everydayness, by corruption scandals, of which there have 
of course been many. This, I think, is the primary reason for the disgust for politics.” 
Zeman’s proposed solutions in the fight against corruption de facto convene with his convictions 
on the causes of corrupt behaviour. When he speaks of the reasons, he also commonly suggests a 
solution. Solutions can be found on various levels. It is necessary to limit the political protection of 
corrupt and godfather mafias. However, Zeman offers no specific directions on this point, and only 
reiterates that changes should be made on the level of the party system. This fully corresponds 
to the statements listed above, dealing with political parties as corrupt and corrupting actors 
(cf. Slomczynski & Shabad, 2011; Mudde, 2004). In his speeches, Zeman therefore vested great 
anti-corruption hopes in his nominated government led by Jiří Rusnok in 2013, which he labelled 
a government of uncorrupted elites fighting against party corruption. While nominating the 
government, he stated, “I believe that you will be a guarantee that scandals will not be swept 
under the rug and that mobsters won’t be made out to be innocent citizens due to political 
pressure.” Pointing to the advantages of direct democracy allegedly meant to take the “will of 
the people” into account is standard populist rhetoric (Antal, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). 
Zeman offers a recipe in the form of direct democracy as a solution to the problem of corruption: 
“I am a supporter of direct democracy and I support the opinion that citizens – because they do 
not have various clientelist connections as some politicians do – can make less biased decisions 
in referendums than these politicians.” These people are thus pure and uncorrupted and thanks 
to this fact are more qualified to make decisions than the political elite, who are susceptible to 
being corrupted. This construction corresponds almost exactly to the theoretical assumptions and 
stances of the concept of populism (cf. Mudde, 2004).
The category that we have already mentioned several times and the one we are now approaching 
is, from an analytical and interpretational standpoint, related to the issue of political populism. 
It is the most interesting and also the most frequent in Zeman’s references to corruption. This 
category deals with the use of corruption as a legitimising or delegitimising label aimed either at 
Miloš Zeman’s followers (or himself) or his opponents. At the same time, this category crosses the 
boundaries of rhetorical constructions, as, through its use, the president is not only expressing 
his opinions, but is entering into the practical political process by handing out these labels (cf. 
Edelman, 1964 or 1988). This finding is also supported by other research concluding that anti-
corruption strategies are often misused and serve as a toll for empowering the political position 
of “anti-corruption warriors” (see Sampson, 2011). Building the “anti-corruption warrior image” 
is a crucial strategy for populists. The basis of the message is an anti-establishment appeal, the 
broad labelling of the existing political elite as corrupt, and offering an alternative in the form of a 
person entering politics from the external environment (an example is Andrej Babiš) or a politician 
that stylises him/herself as one standing outside the parties that are associated with depravity 
and corruption (Miloš Zeman is an example – for years, he was a part of the party establishment 
and strongly shifted his rhetoric toward populism after returning to active politics in the role of 
directly elected president).
We will begin with how Zeman uses the label of corruption as a tool to delegitimise his opponents, 
which is a basic populist strategy (cf. Tarchi, 2016). On a general level, we can claim that the goals 
of this labelling de facto overlap with the goals of individuals that the president has seen as his 
competitors and enemies in a long-term sense. The first of these individuals is what is labelled as 
the right wing in the Czech political spectrum. Zeman has attacked the contemporary right wing 
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and the right wing governments that existed from the first half of the 1990s, after which Zeman 
took the post of prime minister in 1998, blaming the right primarily for corruption linked with 
post-communist privatisation (cf. Arikan, 2008; Holmes, 2003; Grzymala-Busse, 2007). In regard to 
corruption, Zeman also criticises the contemporary right that has functioned over the course of 
his presidential mandate. He relates corruption, godfathers, and the theft of finances primarily to 
the Civic Democratic Party on various levels – he often spoke of both the causes for the collapse of 
Petr Nečas’ government due to corruption scandals and, for example, the former leadership of the 
City of Prague and various scandals linked to this right-led coalition. In Zeman’s words, ODS (Civic 
Democratic Party) is linked to corruption ties and various regional “godfathers”.
/…/ for ODS to gradually become an honest right-wing party that suppresses its godfather 
legacy, I would give them better odds than TOP09 for example, which is a two-person enterprise, 
one of which was kicked out of the Christian Democrats and the other from the Green Party, 
so they founded their own party.17 
Scores of other similar references to the right wing parties and politicians can be found, and there 
is no sense in reiterating them here.18 Another target includes political parties and politics as such: 
“We have a whole array of cases of corrupt politicians.” In other speeches, Zeman commonly 
speaks about corrupt parties, the possibilities to corrupt deputies, etc. Political parties are “plagued 
by many corruption scandals.”
By using the corruption label, Zeman also commonly attacked state apparatuses, specifically 
corrupt courts and the police. He also commonly makes comments about the media, which 
according to his judgment exaggerate or, on the contrary, silence corruption scandals, often based 
on their ownership structure. “[Media like] Respekt weekly, Hospodářské noviny and Aktuálně.
cz [whose shared characteristic is that they] belong to Zdeněk Bakala, the biggest fraudster and 
criminal, in my opinion, after Viktor Kožený.” Here, in addition to the delegitimisation of selected 
media,19 we find a fundamental attempt to denigrate one of the richest Czech billionaires Zdeněk 
Bakala,20 who is often labelled by Miloš Zeman and Andrej Babiš as an ally of the former head of 
government and social democracy Bohuslav Sobotka,21 who was in open conflict with Zeman and 
Babiš. This not only deals with delegitimising Bakala, but Sobotka as well.22 Again, we can point 
out that Zeman creates an image of a network of evildoers against the people (cf. Tarchi, 2016), 
which is made up of corrupt politicians (represented by Sobotka), entrepreneurs (Bakala), and the 
media (Bakala’s media or Czech public service media). 
Thus, some billionaires are labelled by Miloš Zeman as corruptionists, while he is quite forthcoming 
to others and attempts to exculpate them from suspicions of corruption by handing out various 
labels. Specifically, this concerns the previously mentioned Andrej Babiš and Petr Kellner. As an 
example of comments about the latter, “He looks good, he’s successful, and contrary to other 
17      Here we can see that, in addition to the delegitimisation of ODS by pointing to corruption, Zeman is attempting to 
delegitimise another right-wing party TOP09, which is one of Zeman’s strongest critics. He does this by attempting to ridicule 
the base of the party and by distorting facts – Miroslav Kalousek, one of the individuals mentioned by the president, was 
a member of the Christian Democrat Party (and was, in fact, its chairman), who was not thrown out, but left voluntarily. 
Similarly, Karel Schwarzenberg, the other individual that Zeman is referring to, was not ejected from the Green Party, as he was 
never a member; he was only a non-partisan senator, who was proposed by this party for election. Even after founding TOP09, 
he departed from the Greens on friendly terms. As for Schwarzenberg, we can find attempts by Zeman at delegitimising him 
via corruption, as Zeman points out that his opponent criticises corruption only rarely.
18      In this footnote, we can add other examples of these attitudes: “Because there always was a right-wing majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies that canceled anti-corruption law.”; “You have maybe noticed that I stated that Mr. Kalousek, according 
to some sources, was trying to make his last tunnel.”
19      These media outlets are not only owned by Zdeněk Bakala but also share another characteristic – all of them are well 
known for their high-quality investigative journalism often dealing with issues related to Zeman and his political allies. On 
the other hand, Zeman usually does not criticise the media outlets that cooperate with him (for example, newspapers owned 
by Andrej Babiš).
20      In this sentence, we encounter yet another target of the delegitimising label – Viktor Kožený – who is often mentioned 
by Zeman when reiterating criticisms of the privatisation era.
21      Former Prime Minister in 2013–2017. Andrej Babiš used to be minister of finance in his government.
22      It is interesting to note that in the case of his ally Andrej Babiš, one of the richest Czech billionaires and owner of a media 
empire several times larger than Bakala’s, this fact does not seem to bother Zeman.
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Czech entrepreneurs, he’s not responsible for any corruption scandals.”23 Zeman has placed Babiš 
in the role of an uncorrupted billionaire in the field of business (just like Kellner), but also in 
the role of corruption fighter on a political level. This, incidentally, is how Babiš won over many 
voters (cf. Kopeček, 2016) in 2013. In one of his statements, Zeman praises Babiš for supporting his 
proposal to implement the law on declaring income according to the Scandinavian model; at the 
same time, Babiš assumes that it is first necessary to halt tax evasion, which in present discursive 
practice is reflected in the implementation of the highly debated and disputed system of electronic 
registration of sales.24 Just as Babiš supports the implementation of Zeman’s desired law, Zeman in 
exchange approves of the electronic registration of sales, although it has been criticised by a large 
portion of political actors. In this, we find an excellent example of populist political quid pro quo.
Other actors that Zeman attempts to legitimise via the use of references to incorruptibility or 
anti-corruption stances include, for example, the previously mentioned former head of caretaker 
government Jiří Rusnok and, primarily, himself. In Zeman’s case, as was mentioned above, he 
highlights the fact that he was not elected by corrupt means: “I’m glad that it was the citizenry 
that was able to decide who to elect in a direct election, and that it wasn’t dependent on the 
various parliamentary schemes and possibly corruption.” Zeman continues in his critique of the 
Czech parliament, when he states that
If I had been in a parliamentary election, I would never have become [the president] for the 
simple reason that you can corrupt 281 deputies and senators in all various ways. You can’t 
corrupt eight million voters, because there’s not enough money to do so, and that’s why I’m a 
supporter of direct elections.
In addition to the legitimisation of the “purity” of his election (as was stated above), he delegitimises 
his political opponents, including social democrats, who stood against him in 2003 in the indirect 
election, allowing Václav Klaus, former chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, to be elected. 
After this election, Zeman openly spoke about this betrayal and stated, “The presidential election 
was linked to various manipulations, including threats, corrupt offers, bullets in envelopes, and so 
forth.” In addition to his defence of his election, he presents himself as an uncorrupted politician. 
When asked about his trip in Kellner’s private plane, he said, “In my life I’ve never allowed myself 
to be corrupted, so why would I allow myself to be corrupted now, to save three and a half 
hours of my sleep.” Thus, the “incorruptible people” (contrary to the “corrupt politicians”) elected 
Zeman as president, a person who has stylised himself into the role of protector of the interests 
of the people, in whose name action should be taken, and the role of a warrior against corrupt 
politicians. Again, we can consider this construction to be the essence of populism. 
Conclusion
In the introduction, we asked the following question: “How does Miloš Zeman instrumentally 
use the topic of corruption as a tool within his populist political strategy?” As we have shown 
above, the method with which Miloš Zeman creates the image of corruption fulfils the basic signs 
of populist strategy (cf. Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). This behaviour is most evident in the creation 
of an antagonistic relationship between two opposing groups – the pure people, whom Zeman 
attempts to represent (at least rhetorically), and corrupt political elites, who harm the interests 
of the ordinary people through their actions (cf. Mudde, 2004). Zeman understands political elites 
in relation to established political parties, i.e. the existing political establishment (cf. Barr, 2009). 
He places individuals who are not standard or party politicians against the existing elite, which 
is corrupt, and presents them as individuals who are fighting against corrupt political parties. 
This includes Zeman himself – regardless of the fact that for years he was a clear part of the 
23      Links between Zeman and Kellner can be seen in examples such as one of the president’s visits to China, during which he 
returned not in the standard manner (i.e. by government airplane), but in Kellner’s private jet. Later, Zeman commented, “And 
for those who see corruption in this can rest assured that the airplane would have flown from Peking to Prague regardless, 
with or without me.”
24      The electronic registration system is a tool of the Ministry of Finance to control taxes from entrepreneurs.
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top party establishment, he presents himself as a “president of the people” and a defender of 
its interests (against the parties). Another example can be found in Jiří Rusnok, whom Zeman 
nominated for the head of the caretaker government several years ago. Although Rusnok did not 
gain the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, Zeman allowed him to govern for several months 
with the explanation that, contrary to party governments, Rusnok’s government would battle 
corruption and had the “confidence of the people”. Present Prime Minister Andrej Babiš is another 
individual to be named among non-partisan corruption fighters. At present (June 2018), Babiš has 
ruled for half a year without the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies. The alliance between 
the two men is evident in a whole array of facts – for instance, they supported each other in both 
the 2017 parliamentary elections and 2018 presidential elections. Criminal charges against Babiš 
notwithstanding, Zeman presents him as a successful and honourable politician and entrepreneur 
– if we use the metaphor of the Kožený and Baťa type of businessman that Zeman often uses 
himself, Zeman depicts Babiš as a representative of the latter category, i.e. as someone who 
gained his riches thanks to his hard work and as an individual that is trying to purge himself of 
negative phenomena in the field of politics. Quid pro quo, Babiš gives Zeman the label of wise and 
experienced statesman. Zeman’s anti-establishment appeal is further manifested in attacks on the 
police, courts, and selected media outlets, which he has labelled as corrupt actors (cf. Barr, 2009).
The quotes above imply that since his election to the post of president Miloš Zeman has actively 
used the concept of corruption in various respects, but most often as a rhetorical-political weapon. 
This finding of our analysis can be supported not only by the quotes mentioned above, but also by 
the fact that the issues of corruption belonging to the category of “(de)legitimisation label” were 
the most frequently used by Miloš Zeman. This fully corresponds to the assumptions of the theory 
of political populism, as one of the basic principles of populist strategies is the creation of enemies, 
their delegitimisation, and stigmatisation (cf. Tarchi, 2016), which in this case is done via the 
use of corruptionist labels. Miloš Zeman’s use of anti-corruption as a rhetorical-political strategy 
corresponds with Sampson’s (2011) argument that “anti-corruption is not innocent”. We can say 
that Zeman’s framing of corruption serves as a tool to achieve his political goals. Corruption 
is predominantly viewed by the public as a negative phenomenon that harms public finances, 
trust in the political system, and in its institutions (cf. e.g. Karklins, 2005). If a politician who 
has the same significant amount of trust from the public as Miloš Zeman does (as an individual 
and an institution) begins to present him/herself as a corruption fighter, society may gain the 
impression that this person truly is such a fighter (cf. Becker 1963). This happens regardless of 
the fact that Zeman remains only at a level of rhetorical exercises, not real actions (which is also 
something for which he has criticized other politicians in his speeches) (cf. Oliver, Marion & Hill, 
2016). President Zeman often speaks about the anti-corruption solutions that he would like to 
implement – in this respect, it should be said that the Czech president does not have the right 
to initiate legislation (which is typical of parliamentary regimes). His statements, which refer 
to his dedication in solving this problem, are in this respect aimed more toward the public and 
gaining the support of voters that have become disenchanted with extensive corruption (cf. Tedin, 
Rottinghaus & Rodgers, 2011). Again, we can perceive this as another expression of populism in 
Zeman’s political strategy, i.e. promising something that is positively accepted by “the people” but 
is wholly beyond his presidential competencies (Taggart, 2000).
This paper has focused on one of the theories of populism, specifically populism as a political 
strategy (cf. Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Using the empirical example of President Zeman, we have 
illustrated the methods in which such a strategy can be built in practice on anti-corruption 
rhetoric of a populist actor. The text’s contribution lies in the empirical analysis of the topic (i.e. 
corruption), which is an integral part of the theory of populism but is not the subject of a large 
number of studies focusing on political populism. The text and the results of the analysis are also 
significant in a broader regional context. Central and Eastern Europe is a region that is facing 
a weakening of democratic principles (Dawson & Hanley, 2016), which is linked to the work of 
actors (i.e. politicians or even whole parties) of a populist character (e.g. Antal, 2017; Stulík & 
Krčál, 2019). It is our assumption that academic attention and interest in the research of populism 
in this region should be oriented in this direction, i.e. toward specific actors and their specific 
populist strategies. We also find a number of political representatives in the region who label 
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all their opponents (politicians, civil society, NGOs, the media) as corrupt and bribed, acting in 
foreign interests and harming the people (cf. Antal, 2017). This “corruption card” thus makes up 
an integral part of the populist game for political success and for the acquisition/preservation of 
power and the marginalisation of opponents.
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